Decision analysis of PPP project’s parties based on deep consumer participation

Abstract

Although PPP(Public-private partnership) mode has been applied for a long time in infrastructural project, the success rate is not very high. The sustainability of PPP projects is still influenced by many factors. In order to examine the evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) of social capital, government, and paying consumers, a tripartite evolutionary game model is established in this work. In order to further promote consumer participation, it is necessary to make the assumption that customer oversight and review can have an impact on service prices. The results show: i)The strategy choice of consumer depends on the comparison between supervision cost of consumer and price coefficient for consumer to social capital. ii) Consumer supervision can promote the provision of high-quality services by social capital. iii)The difference between high-quality cost and low-quality cost, subsidy coefficient, price coefficient and supervision cost of consumer are critical factors influencing both evolutionary results and trajectories. This paper also puts forward policy implications for the three stakeholders to promote social capital’s high-quality strategy so as to maintain the sustainability of PPP projects.