Who Is There? Finding the Other in the Self

Abstract

Richard Shusterman has written an exemplary essay. Not only does he provide a detailed overview of the philosophical history of his topic, showing the wide range of different views about the virtues and vices of self-knowledge. He also pays detailed attention to the pragmatic dimensions of his topic: the questions of when, where, and how self-knowledge matters. Whereas many of the philosophers and psychologists he discusses point to the dangers of self-examination — particularly that of slipping into melancholia and depression — Shusterman provides us with a more positive outlook, partly by refuting the suggestion of a necessary link between self-examination and depression, partly by distinguishing different modes of self-attentiveness, such as the neurotic and the intellectually curious mode, and partly by distinguishing different foci of self-reflection. It is in relation to the latter that Shusterman makes a case for the role and importance of somatic self-awareness. In my response I would like to raise three issues. The first has to do with the relationship between self-knowledge, self-improvement, and self-transformation. The second has to do with the main object of Shusterman's discussion, the " self. " Thirdly I would like to raise some issues regarding the educational implications of Shusterman's exercise. Although the title of Shusterman's essay focuses on the term " self-knowledge, " this is not the only concept that figures in the discussion. Shusterman also refers to self-examination, introspection, reflection, self-awareness, rumination, self-atten-tiveness, and meditation. Although these concepts all refer to a particular relation-ship of the self to the self, they do not all express a knowledge relationship. It could be argued that particularly at the meditation end of the spectrum, we do not end up with more or better knowledge of ourselves, but first and foremost with a different relationship to ourselves (which may explain the positive effects of meditation listed by Shusterman). The position of self-knowledge is different from this. Self-knowledge, it seems to me, is hardly ever an end in itself, but almost always a means to something else. This is already the case for Socrates who, in his dialogue with Alcibiades, sees the purpose of self-knowledge in relation to becoming a better politician. As Shusterman shows, Socrates is not the only one who emphasizes the connection between self-knowledge and self-improvement, although he is one of the few to link self-knowledge to the domain of politics. Self-improvement is also an important concern for such different philosophers as Immanuel Kant, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Halfway through the essay, it also seems an important concern for Shusterman himself when he states that he wishes to defend the value of self-reflection against overly negative readings of its implications, by recognizing, " with Socrates, that any viable program of self-cultivation and transformation needs to start with some grasp of what one is. " I am, however, not sure to what extent this concern is still central in the final section