La falacia del principio 'una persona, un voto' en la elección de los consejeros regionales en chile

0Citations
Citations of this article
5Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

Abstract

Pro-decentralization initiatives in Chile have been limited and insufficient in part due to the complex tension between a pro-participation message and a reality of structural incentives that makes it difficult for the central government to renounce to powers and attributions in favor of local governments. The Regional Councils (CORES) are among the few successful initiatives to grant additional powers to regional governments. Created in 1993, the CORES posses significant attributions. Yet, despite being a step in the right direction, CORES have design problems that weaken their legitimacy. Because their members are elected through indirect democracy mechanisms, CORES offer an especially interesting case study of democracy. Here, we question the legitimacy of COREs from a representative democracy viewpoint. In addition, the electoral system in place to elect CORE members systematically discriminates against more populous municipalities. Although they can be seeing as a step in the right direction in terms of decentralization, the election rules in place for CORE members do not contribute to strengthen representative democracy. © 2008 Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos "Juan Ignacio Molina" Universidad de Talca.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Quiroga, M. M., & Lucero, P. N. (2008). La falacia del principio “una persona, un voto” en la elección de los consejeros regionales en chile. Universum. https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-23762008000100009

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free