Understanding Trust Assumptions for Attestation in Confidential Computing

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Abstract

Despite its critical role, remote attestation in Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) and Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is poorly specified by Intel with some obvious flaws. We believe that it is part of Intel's strategic policy to create resistance to revealing trust assumptions of the process.

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APA

Sardar, M. U. (2022). Understanding Trust Assumptions for Attestation in Confidential Computing. In Proceedings - 52nd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks - Supplemental Volume, DSN-S 2022 (pp. 49–50). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN-S54099.2022.00028

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