Path-dependency, instituciones políticas y reformas electorales en perspectiva comparada

Abstract

This work examines to what extent changes in electoral institutions are conditioned by the previous electoral configuration. Electoral reforms, once approved, tend to acquire incremental intention and, consequently, are influenced by the previous rules, implying that they follow a path-dependent model. Electoral reforms are less probable the longer the time of existence of the previous electoral system and, if adopted, they show restricted margins of innovation. In order to analyze these hypotheses, I study 84 electoral reforms promoted in 40 countries with competitive political systems between 1800 and 2002. Two aspects are considered within the arena of electoral reform: changes in the modes of representation (plurality-majority, proportional representation, and mixed) and the types of ordering of legislative candidates (closed lists or preferential vote). The results support the premises of this study showing the restrictive effects exerted by time and the previous institutions on electoral changes.