Stackelberg Pricing Policy in Dyadic Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Considering bank’s Deposit and Loan Based on Delay Payment Scheme

Abstract

In reality, supply chain member may apply for loan from bank when he\she is capital-constrained, or may deposit idle capital to bank when he\she is well-funded. This study focuses on the Stackelberg pricing policy con-sidering bank’s deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme in a dyadic capital-constrained supply chain. First, the market demand is given, and then the profit functions of supply chain members are built. According to Stack-elberg game, the four pricing models are constructed for four scenarios. By solving models, optimal pricing policies of supply chain members for each sce-nario can be determined. Finally, impacts of the interest rate for fixed deposit by installments, deposit rate and loan rate on optimal pricing policies are an-alyzed. The research results show that, in manufacturer capital-constrained situation, these rates can affect optimal pricing policies and profits; in re-tailer capital-constrained situation, deposit rate and loan rate have no effect on them, but the interest rate for fixed deposit by installments can still affect them. Our study provides a feasible way for supply chain members in pricing decision considering bank’s deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme in a dyadic capital-constrained supply chain, and contributes to the theoretical research on the capital-constrained supply chain management and the manage-ment practice for capital-constrained supply chain members with bank’ deposit and loan.