Abstract
Peter van Inwagen's puzzle of Descartes's foot, and Chrysippus' similar puzzle of Dion and Theon, do not have as much bearing on the Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts (or DAUP) as is usually supposed. Van Inwagen's argument against DAUP works via his rejection of the "Remainder Principle", which, I argue, is in fact independent of DAUP itself. © 2004 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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CITATION STYLE
APA
Parsons, J. (2004). Dion, Theon, and DAUP. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85(1), 85–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00188.x
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