Markets Gone Hybrid: Institutional Complexity and Work Toward Market Hybridization

Abstract

Objective: the goal of this article is to theorize how institutional complexity and work can lead to the hybridization of markets. Methods: we draw upon a critical and reflexive analysis of institutional complexity and work, as well as the literature on the sociology of markets, to deductively develop a theory of market hybridization. Results: we theorize that hybrid markets arise when institutional work to define the formal and informal rules and norms underlying economic and social transactions (regulation), the infrastructure and resource allocation (allocation), the actors allowed to participate in market exchanges, the roles performed by them (classification), and the perceived value of goods and services available in the marketplace (evaluation) are shaped by non-economic or commercial logics, that is, by increased institutional complexity. Conclusions: by identifying the socio-symbolic mechanisms that organizations and social actors use to promote market hybridization, we contribute to the much-needed in-depth understanding of how environmental, social, and cultural logic can lead to market hybridization through the market’s four comprising elements: regulation, allocation, classification, and evaluation.