Abstract
We introduce a new manipulation strategy available to women in the men-proposing stable matching, called manipulation through an accomplice. In this strategy, a woman can team up with a potential male “accomplice” who manipulates on her behalf to obtain a better match for her. We investigate the stability of the matching obtained after this manipulation, provide an algorithm to compute such strategies, and show its benefit compared to single-woman manipulation strategies.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Bendlin, T., & Hosseini, H. (2019). Partners in crime: Manipulating the deferred acceptance algorithm through an accomplice. In 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019 (pp. 9917–9918). AAAI Press. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917
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