The Indonesian Invasion of East Timor

Abstract

This book investigates the history of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) stance on external intervention in regional affairs. It asks when has ASEAN state resistance to sovereignty challenges succeeded, and when have they failed? ASEAN’s history of (non)resistance is understood in terms of a realist theoretical logic, focusing on the relationship between an ASEAN ‘vanguard state’ and selected external powers. A ‘vanguard state’ is defined as an ASEAN state that comes to the fore of the Association when it has vital interests at stake that it wishes to pursue. Whilst a state’s interests may vary, vital interests relate to state survival and the preservation of state sovereignty. Once a vanguard state has come to prominence, it will perform two major functions, which reflect an external balancing logic. The vanguard state will actively seek out an external power whose interests align with its own, and will seek to portray a united ASEAN front in support of its interests. Using case study analysis and drawing on a large amount of previously unanalysed material, this book contends that when an ASEAN vanguard state has interests that converge with those of an external power, it has an active and substantial role in resisting sovereignty violation.