Democracia constitucional contemporânea e Separação de Poderes: uma análise com base no presidencialismo de coalizão

Abstract

The present article aims to analyse if the representatives of the Executive Branch can ensure success on the legislative process, which is the unique responsibility of the Legislature? For this purpose, the promises of the Brazilian Government to FIFA are taken as a practical example and as a starting point for the article. In an attempt to provide an answer compatible with the contemporary constitutional democracy, at first the theory of another separation of functions, designed by Karl Loewenstein, is presented. On a second stage, we study the coalition presidentialism, focusing on empirical studies that demonstrate that the rate of success and dominance of the Executive Branch in legislative production in Brazil are close to the levels found in parliamentarism. The article concludes that the role of politicy determination, in Brazil, is exercised by the coalition between the Executive and the Legislature, having the President as the main agenda setter. Thus, it is indeed possible for the Executive Branch to promise the production of legislation.