System robustness against misuse

Abstract

The operation of a number of technical systems is related to the danger of events' occurrence posing threat to human health and life, resulting in material damage or damage to the environment. Methods and procedures used for risk management also take into consideration the failure of a human factor as a possible cause of dangerous events' occurrence, but they do not give us the opportunity to take into account the possible intention of man, who can cause a dangerous event on purpose. In view of the terrorist threat we lack a coherent methodology that would enable us to influence a system's ability so that consequences of a dangerous event could be reduced or the system could be protected against misuse by its design solution. This ability of a system is called security robustness. This article presents fundamental approaches of a new methodology that enables us to specify systems' security robustness, to describe and classify "weak" points of the systems, to analyze and assess security robustness level, and to find and suggest effective ways of increasing the systems' security robustness. The presented methodology is based on the assumption that similarly, as in case of dependability and safety, the assurance of system security robustness should also be an object of systematic attention in all phases of the system life cycle, and that the system security robustness is formed in a crucial manner mainly in the early phases of a life cycle (the so called pre-manufacturing stages - conception, development, design). © 2009 WIT Press.