Intergenerational transfers and the stability of the Swiss retirement system

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Abstract

We analyse intended and unintended solidarity transfers between the young and the old in the Swiss retirement system. In addition to the intended solidarity transfers in the pay-as-you-go system, we identify a systematic unintended solidarity transfer from the active population to new retirees in the occupational pension system, which occurs due to the statutory conversion rates not being actuarially fair. After providing an overview of intergenerational transfers in Switzerland, we briefly review the Swiss retirement system. Then, we quantify the unintended transfer in the occupational pension system and finish by discussing several policy measures that could be implemented to avoid this intergenerational transfer. The unintended solidarity transfer casts some doubt on the financial stability and social acceptability of the Swiss retirement system, which is often considered one of the best in the world. As such, the problems of and recommendations for the Swiss system are of interest to other pension systems as well. © 2013 The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics.

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APA

Eling, M. (2013). Intergenerational transfers and the stability of the Swiss retirement system. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance: Issues and Practice, 38(4), 701–728. https://doi.org/10.1057/gpp.2013.28

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