Tech oligarchy and urban mobility in China: the case of DiDi

Abstract

Taking DiDi Chuxing as its case, this Forum Article examines the mechanisms through which tech oligarchy takes shape in the field of urban mobility in China. Through a digital analysis of DiDi’s platform system, combined with policy documents, corporate materials, media reports, and online discussions, the article traces two interconnected processes. First, it shows how DiDi consolidated its central position through regulatory grey zones, institutional ambiguity, and the state priorities associated with techno-nationalism. China’s provisional and localized ride-hailing regulatory system does not merely reflect a lack of regulation; rather, it creates adjustable conditions through which DiDi has been able to maintain a vast supply network and become a key intermediary in local governance. Second, the article argues that DiDi has become difficult to bypass through infrastructural embedding. DiDi’s integration with WeChat Pay, Alipay, super-app portals, and broader mobility infrastructure has transformed ride-hailing from a standalone service into an indispensable point of access to everyday urban mobility. Its expansion into charging networks, vehicle technologies, and related mobility services has further consolidated this gatekeeping position. This Forum Article argues that tech oligarchy is not simply a renaming of market concentration or firm size, but refers instead to a form of sociotechnical power that technology companies acquire once they occupy key points of access, continuously accumulate data, and embed themselves in everyday services and infrastructural arrangements, thereby becoming difficult to bypass and difficult to hold accountable.