Individuals in Securitization: Explaining US Presidents’ Choice to (De)Securitize North Korea

Abstract

Securitization and desecuritization demonstrate how threat (de)constructions can lead to conflictual or cooperative foreign policies. However, due to its focus on collectivities, securitization theory cannot tell us why leaders choose either securitization or desecuritization. Understanding this choice is crucial because (de)securitization processes can prescribe possible foreign policy options and thus affect the likelihood of conflict and cooperation. To account for leaders’ choices, I draw on political psychology and demonstrate the utility of my approach through an explanation of two US presidents’ preferences for (de)securitizing North Korea. Using leadership trait and operational code analysis, I show that psychological variables shaped Bill Clinton’s and George W. Bush’s preferences because they affected their threat perception and inclination toward conflictual or cooperative actions. These preferences had substantial consequences: While Clinton’s desecuritization attempt led to improvements in US–North Korean relations, Bush’s effort to resecuritize North Korea effectively reversed this progress.