The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of 'Post-Crisis' EU Economic Governance

Abstract

How should decision-making under EU economic governance be understood following the euro-crisis? This article argues, contra existing depictions, that the post-crisis EU has increasingly adopted methods of decision-making in the economic field which marry the decision-making structure of inter-governmentalism with the supervisory and implementation framework of the Community Method. While this 'post-crisis' method has arisen for clear reasons-to achieve economic convergence between eurozone states in an environment where previous models of decision-making were unsuitable or unwanted-it also carries important normative implications. Post-crisis governance departs from the mechanisms of legal and political accountability present in previous forms of EU decision-making without substituting new models of accountability in their place. Providing appropriate channels of political and legal control in the EU's 'new' economic governance should be seen as a crucial task for the coming decade.