“¡No pienses, mira!”: Aspectos, persuasión y filosofía en Wittgenstein.

Abstract

In this paper I explore some of the consequences of adopting a strong dissolutory reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. I start by discussing the key texts in support of the strong dissolutory reading, and then moving on to the connection between that reading and the work's literary style, in view of the kind of goal Wittgenstein is portrayed as pursuing. I then go on to develop the consequences of Wittgenstein's understanding of the scope of philosophical therapy in terms of the argumentative resources available to a project defined in his terms, with special consideration to the contrast between argumentation and persuasion. Finally, I propose that we see the work of the philosophical therapist who aims at getting us to see language differently as akin in certain respects to the Wittgensteinian treatment of aspect-seeing.