Intergovernmental bargaining in multilevel autocracies: the case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup Russia

Abstract

This paper studies intergovernmental bargaining in multilevel electoral autocracies, focusing on the case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup held in Russia. Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 14 cases reveals that well-connected political elites were able to secure the right for their regions to host the championship and, as a result, to receive additional transfers from the centre. While previous studies find that intergovernmental bargaining in multilevel electoral autocracies is determined by the ability of sub-national elites to mobilize voters, this study shows that regional elites’ political connections shape the distribution of politically sensitive transfers. However, as control over the electoral arena remains vital for national regime survival, it is politically connected elites who are also able to deliver electoral support that render the best service to the regime. These results capture the complexity in the functioning of multilevel authoritarian systems and suggest that intergovernmental bargaining may contribute to the longevity of the national regime.