A Two-Stage Stackelberg Game Wind-Storage Planning Model Considering a Bus Carbon Intensity Incentive Mechanism

Abstract

In the trend of power system decarbonization, wind power and energy storage planning studies are in full swing. Incentives for wind power and energy storage development are important research topics. However, most studies have proposed incentives from an energy perspective, and few focus directly on incentives from a carbon perspective. To this end, this paper proposes a novel unified bus carbon intensity incentive mechanism from the carbon perspective. A two-stage Stackelberg game wind storage planning model that considers the proposed carbon incentive mechanism is constructed. In the first stage, the carbon flow of the entire system is obtained following economic dispatch based on the carbon emission flow theory. In the second stage, a Stackelberg game wind-storage planning model is constructed to model the game between the power generation company and the power grid company. Through simulation analyses of these cases, the proposed incentive mechanism can effectively guide the construction of wind turbines and energy storage at the best buses. Additionally, by comparing the proposed incentive with the existing incentive mechanisms, this paper finds that the proposed incentive mechanism can achieve a higher carbon reduction effect with a similar total investment in wind turbines and energy storage.