Offshoring the Uncovered Liability Problem: Currency Hierarchies, State-Owned Settlement Banks and the Offshore Market for Renminbi

Abstract

The existence of an uncovered liability has historically benefited foreign banks and lead currencies. Using the case of China’s efforts to fund its foreign exchange needs by exploiting loopholes in the international financial architecture, the paper examines whether using state-owned settlement banks as a means of intermediating a specialised ‘non-deliverable’ financial asset in offshore markets can substitute the institutional and technical prerequisites that developing economies typically lack. The findings show that while offshore money markets can reduce US dollar dependency in areas such as trade invoicing that do not depend on currency delivery, increasing the offshore holdings of RMB is more challenging. The reasons for this are to be found in the way the governance, geographic and credit generating limitations of state settlement banks reinforce the constraints imposed by the uncovered liability problem. The findings distinguish the historical evolution of the RMB’s offshore use from other offshore markets and reinforce the impossibility of separating issues related to trade infrastructures from those related to the structure of the international financial system.