Skepticism in al-Ghazālī and Descartes: A Reply to Sami M. Najm

Abstract

This paper examines Sami M. Najm’s claim that Abū Ḥ āmid al-Ghazālī’s (1058-1111) and Descartes’ (1596-1650) skeptical arguments are similar in the following respect: (1) the process of doubt that depends on the distrust of sense perception and reason, (2) the motivation to arrive at certainty, (3) the nature of doubt being methodological and philosophical at the same time, and (4) their solution to doubt. I argue that while Najm’s first and second claim are to the point, Najm’s third and fourth points are not correct. This is because while al-Ghazālī’s skepticism was philosophical, Descartes’s doubt was methodological. It is true that their solution to doubt depends on intuition, but the character of their intuition is different because for al-Ghazālī it is a divine intuition whereas for Descartes it has a mental character. Although Descartes as a theist might ground the intuition on God, this does not change its mental character.