What Euthyphro Couldn’t Have Said

Abstract

IN THIS PAPER WE ARGUE FOR A SIMPLE VERSION OF DIVINE COMMAND MORALITY, NAMELY THAT AN ACT'S BEING MORALLY RIGHT CONSISTS IN ITS BEING IN ACCORD WITH GOD'S WILL, AND AN ACT'S BEING MORALLY WRONG CONSISTS IN ITS BEING CONTRARY TO GOD'S WILL. IN SO ARGUING, WE CONTEND THAT THIS SIMPLE VERSION OF DIVINE COMMAND MORALITY IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA, EITHER AS PLATO OR AS CONTEMPORARY CRITICS HAVE ORDINARILY PROPOSED IT. NOR, WE MAINTAIN, IS OUR POSITION INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE MOST ADEQUATE FORMULATION OF NATURAL LAW ETHICS. FINALLY WE EXPLAIN WHY EUTHYPHRO COULD NOT HAVE MADE A BETTER CASE FOR HIS OWN POSITION.