Game analysis of international marine petroleum cooperation’s environmental governance: The Bohai gulf oil spill

Abstract

In this paper, we discuss the economic reasons for overexploitation that led to the Bohai Gulf oil spill, using game theory. Based on the Bohai Gulf incident, we present the causes of ocean international petroleum cooperation, reveal the connection between the interests of Chinese local oil companies and that of a foreign oil company, analyze both sides of the benefit equilibrium between ConocoPhillips China Inc. and the government, and examine the three sides of the dynamic asymmetric game equilibrium among ConocoPhillips China Inc., the government, and societal opinion. The study makes the following conclusions. First, Chinese offshore international petroleum cooperation is inevitable due to China’s limited development level in science and technology. Second, Chinese local oil companies and foreign oil companies have formed a community of interests. Third, the two-side dynamic game analysis shows that the punishment for offshore environment pollution is rather low in China. Fourth, the asymmetric evolutionary game model shows that public opinions enhance government supervision, improve punishment for offshore pollution, and significantly increase the cost of excessive development. In addition, our analytical framework can be applied beneficially to the development of other resources, which will provide strategic support for government legislation and international resource management.