How informal intergovernmental organizations facilitate cooptation and promote peaceful change in times of power rivalry

Abstract

Cooptation provides a strategy for powerful states to manage power rivalries through institutional change. It entails coopting weaker (and possibly rising) states to support the institutional order by granting them a greater say in that order. However, the ability of states to broker such arrangements depends on the willingness of rivals to be coopted and on the properties of institutions through which cooptation is pursued. In this article, I contrast the comparative efficacy of pursuing cooptation through formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs) such as the UN or IMF, with pursuing cooptation through informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) such as the G20, which are not legalized and have no independent operational capacity. I argue that while FIGOs have a comparative advantage for managing and maintaining a prevailing institutional order through adaptation, IIGOs often offer a more propitious institutional setting for achieving peaceful transformation of an institutional order in response to power rivalry.