“Bridging the Information Gap: Corporate Governance, Transparency, and Firm Value in Global and Emerging Capital Markets”

Abstract

Capital markets attain allocative efficiency only when investors have access to credible, timely, and comparable information regarding corporate performance and governance standards. Persistent information asymmetry—arising from unequal access to firm-specific knowledge between insiders and external stakeholders—continues to impede efficient pricing, particularly within emerging economies where disclosure frameworks and enforcement mechanisms remain uneven. This article consolidates empirical and theoretical insights from both developed and emerging capital markets to investigate how corporate governance structures and transparency practices jointly influence information asymmetry and firm valuation. Grounded in agency theory, signaling theory, and the economics of information asymmetry, the study synthesizes findings from markets such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Bangladesh, and selected advanced economies to identify conditions under which governance and disclosure reforms yield observable valuation gains. The review reveals substantial heterogeneity across firm size, sector, ownership concentration, and index inclusion, demonstrating that large, visible firms and entities with high investor information demand experience the greatest benefits from strengthened governance and enhanced disclosure. By advancing an integrated conceptual framework that links governance and transparency to firm value through mediating channels (liquidity, cost of capital) and contextual moderators (institutional quality, enforcement intensity), the paper delineates critical boundary conditions shaping policy effectiveness. The study concludes by outlining a forward-looking research agenda and offering actionable insights for regulators, corporate leaders, and investors navigating the evolving governance–transparency–value nexus in globally interconnected capital markets.