Militarism on the colombian periphery in the context of illegality, counterinsurgency, and the postconflict

Abstract

The confluence of illegality, counterinsurgency, and marginality in Colombia has led to the militarization of social life, national politics, policy making, and state practices in peripheral areas. The state has sought not only to conquer and recover territories from the guerrillas but also to reunify the nation, designating the army to achieve this goal. The Plan for Territorial Consolidation promoted a civil-military governance model to bring the state and provide security to these recovered territories by any means necessary, including the use of clowns. I argue that the peace agreement signed in November 2016—after 53 years of armed conflict—is challenging the long-term militarization policy subsumed under a counterinsurgency strategy. Instead, it provides a context for seeing the inhabitants of areas in conflict as citizens rather than guerrilla auxiliaries and makes marginal territories and their populations central to achieving peace. Former guerrilla combatants in Transitory Rural Normalization Zones established in these peripheral areas seek to work with government officials to implement social, political, and economic projects for both demobilized fighters and the communities with which they have shared territory for decades. Nevertheless, the specters of the Cold War and the dirty war haunt these areas as community leaders continue to be assassinated.