Game analysis of Behaviors among Food Safety Governance subjects

Abstract

Effective governance is the fundamental guarantee for effective food safety governance. Food safety governance involves many stakeholders and complex interest conflicts. Effective coordination of the interests and behaviors of all parties is the key to improving governance effectiveness. One of the main dilemmas of food safety governance is information asymmetry. On this basis, this paper discusses the interest relationships and behaviors of the government, enterprises, and the public in the process of food safety governance, and constructs a behavioral game analysis between the central government and local governments and between the government, enterprises, and the public. The results show that the food safety governance is the most effective when the objectives and behaviors of governance subjects are consistent and compatible. The higher the cost of central government governance is, the more proactive local governments are in governance, the better the enterprise self-restrain and self-govern, the greater the enthusiasm of the public to participate in governance is, the more effective the food safety governance.