Abstract
In a recent Stanford Law Review article, Ayres and Bulow [1] propose a radical anonymity-based solution to disrupt the “market” for monetary influence in political campaigns. To realize their proposal, we propose new cryptographic protocols for commital deniable proofs and deniable payment schemes.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
APA
Franklin, M., & Sander, T. (2000). Commital deniable proofs and electronic campaign finance. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 1976, pp. 373–387). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44448-3_28
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