Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation

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Abstract

We introduce two pieces of information (memes) into a diffusion process in which memes are transmitted when agents meet and forgotten at an exogenous rate. At most one meme can be transmitted at each meeting, which one depends on preferences over memes. We find that the conditions under which a unique meme becomes endemic are sufficient for both to become endemic. Segregation according to information preferences leads to polarization, i.e., nobody is informed of both memes, and a loss of information. We show how the likelihood of segregation depends on information preferences and on parameters of the diffusion process.

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Tabasso, N. (2019). Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation. Games and Economic Behavior, 118, 219–240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.003

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