Russia’s war in Ukraine directly speaks to a core theory in nuclear politics: the theory of the nuclear revolution. Whereas this theory argues that nuclear weapons inhibit conflict and competition in international politics, skeptics of the nuclear revolution argue that competition endures in a nuclear world, and that nuclear weapons can even enable such competition. This article argues that the Russia-Ukraine war challenges expectations of the theory of the nuclear revolution, while largely supporting arguments made by the nuclear revolution skeptics. Specifically, the article argues that the theory of the nuclear revolution cannot explain Russia’s use of nuclear threats to enable its conventional aggression, nor can it explain the ways in which Russia has developed its nuclear posture to provide a bargaining advantage in competitive risk-taking scenarios. These findings challenge the leading theory in the field of nuclear politics and yield policy implications for maintaining nuclear stability during crises.
CITATION STYLE
Arceneaux, G. D. (2023). Whether to worry: Nuclear weapons in the Russia-Ukraine war. Contemporary Security Policy, 44(4), 561–575. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2260175
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