Does Collaboration Distribute Power? Evidence From State Forest Lands Governance in the United States

Abstract

Over the last two decades, collaborative approaches to forest governance have become commonplace, valued for their potential to reduce conflict and increase equity and democracy. Despite growing application, little research has explored collaboration on state forestland management within the United States. The state scale is a particularly interesting arena for investigation as limited federal regulation of state land in the US leaves ample room for difference between cases. Furthermore, while the importance of power in collaboration is widely accepted, few empirical studies examine the role of power dynamics in the collaborative governance of natural resources. We conducted a comparative case study of two advisory groups guiding state land decision-making to understand the extent to which power was distributed through their establishment and deliberative processes. While overall results support established theoretical frameworks describing power sources, we found evidence for three sources of power unaccounted for previously. We describe these as the resource of broad perspective, trust via predictability, and the power of veto. We also note the compounding effects of power evident in our cases and posit that implementing power sharing may be easier when the stakes are low. Finally, we highlight that collaborative governance processes do not always develop power for a broad range of impacted parties—a finding that holds important implications for the longevity of power developed through collaborative processes and the advantage of these initiatives.