Possibility of Approaching to Social Order Problem from Individualistic Standpoint-Debates against Attacks of Normativistic Sociology and Social Contract Theory

Abstract

This article aims to bring forth a counterargument against the theoretical positions of E. Durkheim and T. Parsons which criticize utility theory as well as the position of social cotract theory which criticizes invisible hand explanation. By so doing,it is intended to defend both utility theory and invisible hand explanation. To put it another way, this article attempts to refute the theoretical positions of E. Durkheim and T. Parsons which explain the development of cooperation among people through socialization (inspiring of altruism, commitment to interest to the future and public interest) and enforcement of comforming to shared norm, and to show the possibility of developement of cooperation among selfish individuals, without molding the human nature. It is also our intention to refute the position of social contract theory which explains the development of cooperation among selfish individuals through the control (monitoring and sacntioning) of specialized agency,and to show the possibility of development of cooperation among selfish individuals, without such formal control. It is revealed that the strategy of pairwise interaction is evolutionary stable even in the large scale anonymous group. In the game strategy of more than three persons, however, it is proved to be difficult to keep stable cooperation without agreement among them. As the number of persons involved in increases, it becomes more difficult to develop cooperation among them. In short, it is revealed that the developement of cooperation in such a situation comes to be difficlt without formal control (monitoring and sanctioning). © 1991, Japanese Association For Mathematical Sociology. All rights reserved.