On time

Abstract

I start with a description of how we deal with what we are accustomed to call “time.” Th ere are four families of such temporal practices: Chronometry, chronology, chronography, and chronosophy. In other words, we measure “time,” we determine our position in “time,” we register events that occur in “time,” and we think and speak about “time.” Each of these practices ascribes diff erent characters to what it calls “time.” Are they dealing with the same object or with four diff erent objects? If the latter is true, why are they given the same name? And if they are dealing with one and the sameobject, why are there four diff erent approaches to it? Th e remainder of the paper is devoted to an attempt at answering these questions. It shows that what we call “time” is always a coordination of movements and/or changes operated by a coordinating agency. They are diff erent features of movements and/or changes that may be coordinated: Some are quantitative (velocity), others are qualitative (continuity/discontinuity, direction, etc.) And there are diff erent coordinating agencies: The human individual, the brain, society, the Sun. Because of that, time is plural and heterogeneous. It’s also a historical entity insofar as all temporal practices are products of history and evolve in its course. Hence, the diversity of opinions about time.