Abstract
In Sparing Civilians, Seth Lazar claims that in war, with rare exceptions, killing noncombatants is worse than killing combatants. This paper raises some doubts about whether this is an important principle – at least, once we understand Lazar’s clarifications. It also suggests that however it is clarified, it seems false. And it suggests a related principle that more plausible. This related principle applies only to those with just aims, and it applies only to intentional killing rather than to all forms of killing.
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CITATION STYLE
Tadros, V. (2018). The moral distinction between combatants and noncombatants: Vulnerable and defenceless. Law and Philosophy, 37(3), 289–312. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-018-9327-7
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