Demonstrative science

Abstract

From the thirteenth century down to the Renaissance, philosophers attempted to forge plausible accounts of Aristotelian 'demonstrative science' and its basis, the 'knowledge-producing syllogism'. The first known commentator on the entire Posterior Analytics in the Latin West, Robert Grosseteste, in effect endorsed Anselm's Augustinian treatment of the nature of truth. Thomas Aquinas is better known for treating theology as a demonstrative science than for contributing to the theory of science. In the writings of Duns Scotus the concept of demonstrative science undergoes a substantial change which may have had roots in the Condemnation of 1277. William Ockham endorsed many of the tenets of Aristotle's theory of demonstrative science while using the notions of evidentness and divine power to erode its epistemic importance. In response to Autrecourt's strict interpretation of evidentness, John Buridan took up the defence of natural science.