Intergenerational mobility through inhabited meritocracy: Evidence from civil service examinations of the early- and mid-Ming dynasty

Abstract

The civil service examination system emerged to strengthen the emperor's power by recruiting political elites through open examinations. Did it, during the early- and mid-Ming dynasty, facilitate intergenerational mobility? Rather than oversimplifying it as a single-stage system of meritocracy, we propose a two-stage evaluation framework. In the first stage, the Metropolitan Exam featured merit-based evaluations and generated credentials necessary for becoming political elites. The subsequent non-eliminating Palace Exam then functioned to assess the students’ organizational fit in line with an emperor's political calculations. In particular, those whose families served in the bureaucracy were favored, while those from affluent families were discriminated against. We test this two-stage framework using the records of 12,427 students who passed 46 exams between 1400 and 1580, a period characterizing the heyday of this system. Our empirical findings from the mixed-effect regression models confirm this argument and suggest promising directions for future research.