CONFLITOS DE AGÊNCIA, GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA E O SERVIÇO PÚBLICO BRASILEIRO: UM ENSAIO TEÓRICO

Abstract

Brazilian public service is based on laws and rules that tend to service, in some cases, be exercised in a way in which the interest of those who perform it is divergente from whoever hired. The agency theory predicts that the possibility of hiring and delegating powers to managers who do not necessarily hold some share in the company's equity capital entails a partitioning problem between ownership and control, in which the interests of the owner, in this case called Principal, end up not becoming the same as the hired managers, in this case, the agent. The role of Corporate Governance is to monitor the relationship between management (agents) and (principal) owners and reduce the differences between them, especially regarding information asymmetry. This work, through a theoretical essay, seeks to present the existing relationships, based on the literature, on the Agency Theory and Corporate Governance in the application in the sector and public services. In the presented context, a good Governance structure becomes recommendable for an effective administration and management in the organs of the public sector. It was possible to perceive that the principles of Corporate Governance, such as disclosure, Accountability and Fairness, are in accordance with the principles of Public Administration, mainly related to Advertising and Morality.