The myth of coercive diplomacy: the U.S. intelligence community and the war in Bosnia

Abstract

In 2013, the Central Intelligence Agency declassified over 2,000 pages of documents pertaining to the 1992–95 Bosnian War. While several scholars have studied these documents, they have not grasped the degree to which this record undermines the prevailing narrative of the Clinton Administration’s Bosnia policy. This narrative asserts that the administration was initially reluctant to intervene in Bosnia due to the concerns of European allies, before finally deploying ‘coercive diplomacy’ against recalcitrant Bosnian Serb forces in 1995 to end the war. Yet this article demonstrates that the documents declassified in 2013 provide no support for the efficacy of ‘coercive diplomacy,’ presenting a narrative of the ‘Road to Dayton’ that emphasizes the importance of compromise over the celebration of coercion.