On Distinguishing Functional Ecology and Evolution in Cultural Theory

Abstract

As a legacy from Julian Steward, cultural anthropology has moved “away from the preoccupation with issues of origins that was characteristic of the earlier evolutionary outlook” (Miller and Weitz). Indeed, some have maintained that the distinction between functional ecology and evolution “dissolves” in the dynamics of ecological operations (Rappaport). However, a firm distinction is made in biological theory between the “operation” problem and the “origin” problem. This distinction between functional ecology and evolution is also emphasized by “new evolutionists” (Diener, Nonini, and Robkin 1978, 1980). In this paper, documentation is provided demonstrating that a more adequate understanding of complex systems structures, complex systems processes, temporal process, systemic history, and rapid change is available if we begin by recognizing functional ecology and evolution as “distinct, but related.” We need to return to the evolutionary viewpoint once so influential in American anthropology, and use it to complement ecological analyses.