On the relation between the mind and the brain: A neuroscience perspective

Abstract

In this paper I show that computational neuroscience provides an important new approach to traditional problems in philosophy such as the relation between mental states and brain states (the mind-body or mind-brain problem), to determinism and free will, and helps one with the 'hard' problem, the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. One of the themes of the paper and of my book Neuroculture: on the Implications of Brain Science ([Rolls 2012c]) is that by understanding the computations performed by neurons and neuronal networks, and the effects of noise in the brain on these, we will gain a true understanding of the mechanisms that underlie brain function. Part of the solution proposed to the mind-body problem is that the mind and the brain are different levels of explanation of information processing, the correspondence between which can be understood by understanding the mechanisms involved using the approach of computational neuroscience. But this does leave some 'hard' problems, such as the problem of phenomenal consciousness, and while I have provided new suggestions about this in this paper, one must recognise that there is still somewhat of a gap in our understanding of events in the brain and the subjective experiences that may accompany them. The explanation I offer is that when it 'feels like something' this is just a property of a computational process that has thoughts about its own thoughts (higher order thoughts), and with the thoughts grounded in theworld.