Iran’s Nuclear Policy: A Cognitive Study on Defiance and Compliance

Abstract

This paper argues that the divides in Iran’s nuclear behaviour between the three periods of 2005-2012, 2012-2016 and 2016-2021 are reflections of the varying modes of Iran’s cognising the value of the nuclear program versus its costs. The predominant belief in the first period that Iran is in the gain domain made it defiant and risk-averse leading to Iran’s avoidance of entering a pact with the untrusted US. The change of belief that Iran moved to the domain of losses as a result of sanctions drove Tehran more risk-taker and compliant in the second period and a part of the third period. This resulted in conclusion of the nuclear deal and the efforts to maintain it. While suffering in the domain of losses, the belief that another deal with the US is a predetermined failure explains the rest of the third period’s Iranian fluctuation between compliance and defiance.