Euthyphro'S "Dilemma", Socrates' Daimonion, and Plato's God

2Citations
Citations of this article
5Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

Abstract

In this paper I start with the familiar accusation that divine command ethics faces a «Euthyphro dilemma». By looking at what Plato's Euthyphro actually says, I argue that no such argument against divine-command ethics was Plato's intention, and that, in any case, no such argument is cogent. I then explore the place of divine commands and inspiration in Plato's thought more generally, arguing that Plato sees an important epistemic and practical role for both.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Chappell, T. (2010). Euthyphro’S “Dilemma”, Socrates’ Daimonion, and Plato’s God. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2(1), 39–64. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v2i1.350

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free