In this paper I start with the familiar accusation that divine command ethics faces a «Euthyphro dilemma». By looking at what Plato's Euthyphro actually says, I argue that no such argument against divine-command ethics was Plato's intention, and that, in any case, no such argument is cogent. I then explore the place of divine commands and inspiration in Plato's thought more generally, arguing that Plato sees an important epistemic and practical role for both.
CITATION STYLE
Chappell, T. (2010). Euthyphro’S “Dilemma”, Socrates’ Daimonion, and Plato’s God. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2(1), 39–64. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v2i1.350
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