Deterrence in Peace Operations: Look Beyond the Battlefield and Expand the Number of Targets and Influence Mechanisms

Abstract

Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee for or Threat to Strategic Stability? Alexey Arbatov Open Access Chapter First Online: 04 December 2020 Part of the NL ARMS book series (NLARMS) Abstract In recent literature, much attention has been paid to factors that affect nuclear deterrence and stability from the outside: new missile defence systems, non-nuclear (conventional) high-precision long-range weapons, the influence of third and threshold nuclear states, space weapons, and—more recently—cyber threats. These new factors have pushed the core of nuclear deterrence—strategic relations between Russia and the United States—to the background in the public consciousness. Yet dangerous changes are taking place. This chapter examines the real and imaginary causes of the current situation and suggests potential ways to reduce tensions that could benefit international security. It concludes that nuclear deterrence can serve as a pillar of international security with one crucial reservation: namely, that it can only work in conjunction with negotiations and agreements on the limitation, reduction, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Without such checks, nuclear deterrence goes berserk. It endlessly fuels the arms race, brings the great powers to the brink of nuclear war in any serious crisis, and sometimes the very dynamics of nuclear deterrence can instigate a confrontation. It is important to emphasize that the content of strategic stability was agreed upon during the negotiations for START I, signed in 1991, the complex provisions of which embodied all the principles of this concept. These were subsequently reflected in the 1993 START II, the 1997 START III Framework Agreement, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), and New START. As major parallel measures, deep parallel reductions were conducted regarding tactical nuclear arms, negotiations to conclude a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for military purposes (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) began in 1993, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed in 1996. As a result of the implementation of these agreements, today’s strategic balance looks much more stable (according to the criteria agreed upon in 1990) than on the eve of the 1990s, that is, before the signing of START I. The permitted levels of strategic weapons have been reduced about six-fold for warheads, almost threefold for deployed delivery systems, and by about thirtyfold for total mega tonnage.9 The ratio of warheads to delivery systems has decreased from 5:1 to 2:1. The share of arms with increased survivability,10 which once stood at 30–40%, now amounts to 60–70% of the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals.