Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Shared Manufacturing by Manufacturing Companies under Government Regulation Mechanism

Abstract

In order to study the decision-making behavior of the participating groups in shared manufacturing, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of shared manufacturing by manufacturing companies under government regulation mechanism. Using evolutionary game theory, it is to analyze the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the model. The utilization efficiency of government regulatory input and the influence of government nonregulation in the proportion of regulatory income are discussed. MATLAB numerical simulation is used to analyze the influence of different parameter changes on the evolution result. It is concluded that the initial sharing probability of manufacturing companies, the level of trust in the company, the government's penalties for nonsharing parties, the utilization efficiency of government inputs and the rewards given to the government by the state all play a positive role in promoting shared manufacturing and government regulation of manufacturing companies. The lower the ratio of government nonregulation to the income of regulation is, the more active government regulation is. In addition, the shared income should be distributed reasonably. Therefore, in the shared manufacturing process, all the above factors should be considered.