Interim measures in EU competition cases: Origins, evolution, and implications for digital markets

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Abstract

So in the years ahead, one of the greatest challenges that we’ll face, as competition enforcers, will be to stop big tech companies from wiping out competition, by nudging markets past the point of no return. The best answer to that will be to move fast. But in a Union of law, where companies have an absolute right to defend themselves, there will always be limits to how fast we can move. This iswhy I expect that the decisionwe took a fewweeks ago, to impose interim measures on Broadcom, is a sign of things to come. Before last month, we last used interim measures in 2001. But I do not expect to wait another 18 years before we do it again. In Broadcom’s case, we were dealing with a familiar threat to competition—an exclusivity arrangement that stopped Broadcom’s customers buying chips from anyone else. And it was also pretty clear that if we did not act, the market could soon tip—because several of the companies that buy these chips will soon run tenders for new supplies. Not every future case will be so clear cut, of course. But it’s important that we have this tool available— because it canmake a vital difference in the caseswhere it’s appropriate.

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APA

Mantzari, D. (2020). Interim measures in EU competition cases: Origins, evolution, and implications for digital markets. Journal of European Competition Law and Practice, 11(9), 487–498. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpaa045

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