On the security of CAMELLIA against the square attack

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Abstract

Camellia is a 128 bit block cipher proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi.We discuss the security of Camellia against the square attack. We find a 4 round distinguisher and construct a basic square attack. We can attack 5round Camellia by guessing one byte subkey and using 216 chosen plaintexts. Cosidering the key schdule, we may extend this attack up to 9 round Camellia including the first FL/FL-1 function layer.

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Yeom, Y., Park, S., & Kim, I. (2002). On the security of CAMELLIA against the square attack. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 2365, pp. 89–99). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45661-9_7

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