Economic and low-carbon dispatch of industrial integrated energy system with EV load based on Stackelberg game framework

Abstract

Industrial integrated energy systems (IESs) and electric vehicles (EVs) provide new solutions for addressing the increasing challenges of the energy crisis and environmental pollution. With the increasing number of EVs and smart charging stations in industrial IES, the uncoordinated charging load of EVs imposes significant pressure on IES. Therefore, a well-designed dispatch scheme is crucial for reducing the economic cost for both parties, alleviating the energy supply pressure on IES, and promoting the development of a low-carbon society. To this end, given the load characteristics of EVs in industrial IES, we propose a dispatch framework based on the Stackelberg game theory, which includes the leader and the follower. The leader IES is responsible for formulating both unit dispatch and demand response plans, as well as determining the charging pricing for the smart charging station. The follower smart charging station optimizes EVs charging power by minimizing the charging cost in order to protect the interest of EV owners. Additionally, we introduce the carbon emission flow model into charging station pricing to shift the responsibility for carbon emissions from the generation side to the EV load side. Considering that the two-layer game model is difficult to solve, we use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition and duality theorem to transform it into an equivalent single-layer optimization problem, which is easily solved. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed game framework effectively reduces the economic cost of IES and the charging cost of EVs, alleviates the pressure from charging load, and reduces the carbon emissions of industrial IES.