Educational cooperation in the perspective of tripartite evolutionary game among government, enterprises and universities

Abstract

Government-enterprise-university synergy (GEUS) is an effective way to mobilize government, enterprises, and universities to collaborate on education, but these three parties involved in GEUS may, out of bounded rationality, choose to collaborate in ways that benefit themselves and harm others. To guide the three parties to better cooperation, this study creates an evolutionary game model among the three parties and evaluates the applicability and validity of the model by selecting the educational cooperation data in Beijing. It is shown that participation in education cooperation is the best course of action for all three parties. The intensity of willingness to participate in the GEUS is on the order of high to low for universities, enterprises, and the government. If the three parties wish to accomplish education collaboration sooner, they can increase default payments, boost government revenues, raise corporate participation in distribution, and reduce government and government spending. These results highlight the inherent regularities of GEUS and provide concrete implementation strategies to improve the efficiency of education cooperation.