Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis for Rumor Spreading on Weibo Based on MA-PT

Abstract

With the rapid development of social media, Weibo rumors have increasingly attracted widespread attention. To maintain sustainable development of network ecology, it is necessary to clarify the evolution law of rumor propagation. First, evolutionary game model is applied to examine the interaction mechanisms of complex behaviors between Weibo rumor makers, Weibo users and governments in accordance with MA-PT (Mental Accounts and Prospect Theory). Next, the replication dynamic equation is used to solve the equilibrium strategy points of each player. It was found that the evolution game does not have a stable equilibrium point. Finally, we conduct empirical simulation to verify the model and primary conclusions. Results demonstrate that, 1) The reference value plays an important role in the strategic choices of players. 2) With the high value of psychological satisfaction of 'Herding effect,' Weibo users choose to repost rumors. 3) Increasing the value of punishment, Weibo rumor makers are less likely to adopt the strategy of making rumors. 4) The higher loss of social unrest can encourage governments to adopt strict management strategies to maintain good online order. The results can guide governments to make better decisions in network governance.