International regimes and world peace: A case study of NPT and CTBT

Abstract

Our purpose in this article is to show that such characterization of international regimes does not correspond to the reality of international relations; that world peace is necessarily a function of the stable equilibrium of the international system; and that international regimes, whether of the rational-bargaining or the hegemonic-stability variety, cannot be expected to provide a stable equilibrium either within themselves or in the international system as a whole. We wish to argue further that in an anarchical international system, an international regime must necessarily be characterized by coercive hegemony, and that 'hegemonic stability' is unattainable by a regime in such an international system. There is also no reason to believe that the relations of an international regime with its external environment must necessarily be characterized by cooperation, hegemony, and peace. On the contrary, in the absence of a global regulatory authority, the relations between an international formation, and states, are likely to be characterized by domination and conflict rather than harmony and cooperation. We shall conclude by arguing that international regimes can play a positive role as an agency of international equilibrium and stability, and hence also of world peace, only in a supranationally and democratically regulated, rather than an anarchical, international system.